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Keith M. Carison
EDEBAL debt held by the public including the
Federal Reserve System) has risen relative to GNPover
thepast 10 years, with most of the increase occurring
since 1981 (see chart ii. This recent increase in the
federal debt-GNP ratio reverses a downward trend
that had prevailed from the end ofWorld War II. Fur-
thermore, as of early this year, the Congressional
Budget Office CR0) projected that a continuation of
current budget policies would lead to further rises in
the debt-to-GNP ratio through 1989.
This change in trend is viewed with concern by
most economic analysts. According to the CBO:
Historical experience suggests that increases and de-
creases in federal debt relative to GNP have been ac-
companied by approximately offsetting changes in
non-federal debt as a percentage of GNP. Similarly,
growth trends in the federal debt-GNP ratio appear to
have been mirrored by oppositetrends in the capital-
output ratio.’
Should history repeat itself, the rising federal debt-
GNPratio will produce slower economic growth anda
lower standard of living than would otherwise occur.
The accuracy of the CBO’s projections depends, of
course, on how accurately it is able to predict both
deficits and future GNP? Two problems make it dif-
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2For a critique of the procedures used bythe CBO and theOffice of
Management and Budget, see Klein (1984).
ficult to obtain accurate projections ofthesetwo varia-
bles. First, these variables are interrelated; conse-
quently, their feedback effects must be taken into
account. Second, assumptions about the future
course of monetary policy are crucial to the analysis;
different assumptions will produce widely varying
projections of both future deficits and future GNP.
The purpose ofthis article is to examine the impor-
tance of monetary policy assumptions in the assess-
ment of the federal debt-GNP ratio. To aid in this ex-
amination, simulations from a modified version ofa St.
Louis-type model are used in conjunction with a
model ofbudget anddebt determination. Because this
model is sensitive to changes in money growth, it can
beused to determine the effect ofalternative monetary
policies on the federal debt-GNP ratio.
AFRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Therole for monetarypolicy in the determination of
strategic budget variables can be described with the
aid of a schematic diagram see page 6).For a given tax
structure and set of outlay programs, the economic
variables — real GNP, unemployment, the price level
and interest rates -~ impinge strongly to determine
the budget outcome in a given period.’ These varia-
bles, in turn, are affected by the growth of the money
stock. The size ofthe federal debt held by the public
‘In this diagram, the connection between economic variables and
budgetvariables is predominantly in one direction, reflectingprimar-
ily the results of previous econometric studies.
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relative to GNP is a convenient way of summarizing
budget policy under a set of economic assumptions
over a period ofyears.
With the aid ofthis schematic diagram, the key vari-
ables can be identified easily. The model must be ca-
pable of tracing a path through time for real GNP, the
price level IGNPdeflator) and interest rates. Given the
responses of receipts and outlays, a time path for the
federal debt can be derived. Then, to explore whether
the fedei-al debt grows explosively over time, the size
of the debt can be compared with GNP.
Summary of the Model
The model used in this article is an augmented
monetaiy model.~ For details, see appendix A.) The
key feature of the model is that nominal GNP is deter-
‘Forfurther details on its properties, see Carlson and Hem (1983).
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Chart 1








mined by current and lagged values of the money
stock (MU; in other words, fiscal variables were not
found to be significant in the determination of GNP.’
GNP is then divided between output and prices via a
priceequation. The GNP deflator isspecified as afunc-
tion ofcurrent and lagged values ofthe relative price of
energy, demand pressure and anticipated price
change. The 10-yearTreasury bond rate is a function
of past inflation. The 3-month Treasury bill rate is a
function of current and lagged values of changes in
output and prices.
The budget portion ofthe model consists of anout-
lays equation and a receipts equation.’ These equa-
‘This specification contrasts with that used in Carlson and Hem in
that federal expenditures are omitted. For empirical support, see
Hafer (1982).
6Forfurther detail, see appendix B. See Carlson (1983) for further
discussion of these equations.
tions depend on a given outlay program and a set of
tax laws,respectively, as well as the growth ofrealGNP
and inflation. Interest payments are specified as a
function of the two interest rates in the model, the
portion of the budget deficit financed by the public,
the size of the federal debt and the amount of debt
maturing within ayear. Severalotherbudget identities
are specified to generate additional variables and to
close the model so that it can be solved.
Properties ofthe Model
The properties of the model are monetarist,
Changes in the growth rate of money change the
growth of nominal GNP quickly, with the full effect
achieved within five quarters. Initially, this change in
nominal GNP is translated into a change in output
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money growth with a much longer lag than nominal
GNP does.The 3-month Treasury bill rate responds to
a change in money viaits effects on output and prices.
The Treasury bond rate, on the other hand, responds
more slowly to money because it depends only on
past prices.
Overthe longerrun, theeffects of a change in mone-
tary growth are reflected only in nominal variables,
that is, nominal GNP, inflation and nominal interest
rates. The achievement of fulladjustment to a steady-
state growth path takes about 30 years. For the five-
year timehorizon used by the government for budget
analysis, output growth is still influenced by money
growth; that is, the steady-state equilibrium has not
yet been attained. To gain more insight into the future
prospects for thebudget, the model is simulated to its
steady-state equilibrium, which occurs around 2015.
This longer-run perspective yields conclusions that
differ from those thatresult from focusing on the con-
ventional five-year budget horizon.
THE BUDGET EFFECTS FOR
ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICIES:
1984—89
Eachyear the CR0 provides a set ofestimates that it
calls “baseline projections.” These are projections of
what federal receipts and outlays would be ifcurrent
laws and programs were to continue for the next five
years. In other words, despite the use of the term
“projections,” these are not forecasts of the budget;
they are meant to be used as baseline estimates
against which proposed changes in tax laws and
spending programs can be measured and assessed.
In theprocess ofpreparing these estimates, theCR0
develops a set of economic assumptions? This is a
necessary part of the process because receipts and
outlaysdepend crucially on economic conditions. Re-
ceipts depend, of course, on taxable income and sales
which, in turn, depend on inflation and real growth.
Similarly, outlays also are influenced by real growth,
mainlyviaunemployment, and inflation, since a large
number of programs are now indexed to the cost of
living. Interest on the federal debt obviously depends
7Normally a third effect is included — a liquidity effect. However,
usingquarterly data the effect of contemporaneous changes in the
growth rate of money was not found significant.
‘For further discussion of the role of economic assumptions in the
budgeting process, see Carison.
on the level of interest rates as well as the size of the
deficit and the amount and maturity structure of out-
standing debt.
The CEO’s 1984 report on the budget is particularly
bleak? According to the CEO’s baseline estimates, the
federal deficit will continue to grow in dollar terms
throughout the 1984—89 period. Even when scaled
against a growing GNP, the CR0 concludes that the
“deficit projections are obviously alarming.” As sum-
marized in the ratio of federal debt to GNP, the base-
lineprojections indicate that the sharp increase in the
ratio in 1982—83 will continue through the 1984—89
period.
Economic iIssumptions
To assess thevalidity of the CEO’s conclusions, the
monetary model was simulated using three different
monetary scenarios — 4, 6 and 8 percent growth of
Ml. These three alternative money growth assump-
tions produced alternative paths for real growth, in-
flation and interest rates.
Table I summarizes the CEO’s baseline projections
and the simulations by the monetarymodel. Although
the CEO’s projections are derived under the assump-
tion that money growth will be 6 percent, their results
are not generally consistent with those obtained from
the monetary model using 6 percentgrowth in money.
In particular, the CEO’s estimate of the dollar level of
nominal GNP in 1989 falls about halfway between the
results from simulations using 4 percent and 6 per-
cent money growth.
The difference between the CBO’s projections and
the monetary model’s simulations translates primarily
into a difference in the projections for output. The
CB0’s projected level of real GNP for 1989 lies below
that generated by the model using 4 percent money
growth. Their relatively lowprojections ofoutput tend
‘CBO (February 1984), part II. The analysis in this article (for both the
CBO and theadministration) is based on reports prepared in Febru-
ary 1984. Since thentheCBO has prepared new baselineestimates
(CBO, August 1984) and the administration has released its Mid-
Session Review of the Fiscal Year 1985 Budget (0MB, August 15,
1984). The February estimates are used here because of their
comparability; both the baseline estimates and the administration
estimates are prepared on the basis ofcommon CBO assumptions.
Such comparability is not availablefor the August estimates. How-
ever. examination of the CBO’s revised baseline estimates indicates
thatthe conclusions are not materially affected. The estimates de-
veloped in this article are meant to serve as illustrations rather than
precise projections.
‘°CBO(February 1984), part II, p. 6.
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to increase their estimates of the baseline deficit; their pared at the bottom of table 1.The CEO’s pr’ojections
estimates of outlays are higher and their estimates of of the Treasury bill rate are consistent with the
receipts are lower. The CEO’s projections of the price model’s simulations using 6 percent money growth.
level, on the other-hand, are quite close to the model’s The CEO’s projections of the Treasury bond rate, on
simulation using 6 per-cent money growth. the other hand, are not; instead, they resemble more
closely the model’s result using 8 per-cent money
The differences in interest rateprojections are com- growth. Even using that comparison, however, the
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CEO’s projections are generally higher throughout the
period.”
Higher- interest i-ate estimates will produce higher
estimates ofthe deficit. Furthermore,there isacrucial
cumulative effect — higher interest rates add to the
current deficit, which carries over to future years in
the form of larger debt that must be financed.
Simulating the Monetary Model with
CBO’S Baseline Estimates
Table 2 summarizes the model’s simulation of i-c-
ceiptsand outlays and compares them with the CEO’s
‘1The CBO projects a continuation of the large disparity between
interest rates and inflation rates that has been observed recently.
The monetary approach assumes implicitlythat interest rates even-
tually will return to levels consistent with past relationships with
inflation.
estimates. The CEO’s estimated receipts are slightly
more than the model’s estimates using 4 percent
mone’vgrowth. fly 1989, the CEO’sestimate ofreceipts
is $106 billion below that gener-ated by the model us-
ing 6 percent money growth. The composition of GNP
is instrumental in pr-oducing this result. Because the
CRC) has a relativelylow estimate of r’eal growth, their
estimate of the growth of r’eceipts is also lower.
The CBO’s estimated outlays are well above the
highest estimate derived fr’om the model. This differ--
ence again reflects the relatively low level of output
that the CEO projects. As a result, outlays for unem-
ployment compensation and the amount of deficit to
be financed are highei-as is the CEO’s estimate for the
interest rate on Treasury bonds. Differences in fore-
casts for interest rates can accumulate quickly into
higher deficits via their effect on outlays. The model
simulates interest payments using an equation esti-
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mated ovel a sample penod of 1955—SB see appendix
RI. The CEO does not estimate a single-interest pay-
ments equation; instead, its estimates are based on a
detailed analysis of the components of the federal
debt.’>
When the model’s estimates of receipts and outlays
are combined, the resulting budget picture is less
bleak than the CEO’s projections indicate. The
model’s surplus/deficit projections show clearly that
the size of the projected deficit is very sensitive to the
rate of monetary growth assumed. With 4 percent
money growth, the deficit increases in dollar amounts
through 1989; however, the rise is smaller than what
the CEO projects. When 6 percent money growth is
assumed, thebudget deficitslowly declines. With even
more rapid money growth, the budget moves towar-d
surplus after 1989, but, ofcourse, inflation also is more
rapid.
Perhaps the most dramatic difference between the
CEO’s projections and those obtainedfrom themodel
appears when the time paths forfederal debt held by
the public are compared. The cumulative effect ofdefi-
cits over six years generates a public debt of $2,406
billion with 4 per-cent money growth, $2,115 billion
with 6percent moneygrowth, and$1785 billion with 8
percent money growth. Because the CBO projects
higher deficits for every year than does the model,
federal debt held bythe public rises to $2,652 billion in
1989 under the CEO projections.
Simulating the Monetary Model with the
Administration’s Budget
Given the model’s simulations, either the budget
situation or-the outlook for inflation is bleak. Although
the situation projected by the monetary model is not
quite as bad as that seen by the CEO, the broad con-
clusions about continuing large budget deficits are
generally the same. To determine what might be re-
quired to prevent continued large deficits, the admin-
istration’s budget, as prepared in February 1984 and
recalculated with the CEO’s economic assumptions, is
subjected to the same exercise used in the previous
section.’>
I2Forfurther discussion of the CBO’s procedures, see CBO (Septem-
ber 1984).
“0MB(February 1984), and CBO (February 1984), An Analysisofthe
President’s Budgetary Proposals forFiscal Year 1985.
The administration’s budget for’ 1985—89, summa-
rizedin table 3, can be compared with the CEO base-
line estimates in table 2. Note that the administration
proposed modest increases in revenues, amounting to
only an additional $23billion in 1989.According to the
CEO’s analysis ofthe administration’s budget, thepro-
posed revenue increases stem from the following:
Iii taxation of health insurance premiums;
(21 “structural refo,-m”proposals, mainly in the form of
limitations on tax-exempt leasing and on piivate-pui-
pose tax-exempt bonds; and
(3) restrictions on taxshelters and on accounting and
corporate tax abuses.
The proposals ar-c not major; the CEO estimates that
by 1987—89 primary revenues would be increasing
only at a slightly faster rate than the CEO baseline
estimates, 8.8 pci-centvs. 8.5 percent.
With regard to outlays, the administration program
is somewhat more ambitious; outlays are projected to
be $62 billion less than the CEO’sbaseline estimate by
1989. The administration’s program proposes consid-
erable change in the composition of federal spending.
For 1989, relative to the CEO’s baseline projections.
defense spending would be $11 billion higher, entitle-
ment programs would be $15 billion lower, nonde-
fense discretionary spending would be $17 billion
lower, “offsetting receipts” would be higher- by $6 bil-
lion and net inter-est would be lower by $10 billion
Although these differences do not appeal’ large, the
administration’s estimate for primary outlays for the
1987—89 period would be increasing at a 7.1 perceni
rate, which compares with the CEO’s baseline esti-
mate of an 8.9 percent i-ate of increase.
Thesimulation results for the model using adminis-
tration estimates ar-c summarized in table 3. When
compared with table 2, the contour-s of the deficit to
GNP appear little different, especially in the early
years. Closer inspection reveals that, for agiven money
growth, the administration piogi-am moves either to-
ward surplus or toward a smaller-deficit by 1989. This
shows how relatively small changes in the growth
rates ofreceipts and outlays can alter significantly the
outlook for the deficit and the federal debt, even by
1989. It is to be noted, however, that the prospects for
the debt improve in conjunction with an inflationary
monetary policy.
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The previous comparisons demonstrate that the
monetary model yields smaller deficit estimates than
those using the CEO baseline projections. ‘The chief
conclusion ti-ow the simulations derived from the
model is that faster money growth will produce
smaller deficits up to 1989.’’
Because public discussion of the effects of future
deficits suggests that they ar-c concerned with periods
“Thisresult suggests that a goal of a balancedbudget is meaningless
unless there is an explicit accounting for monetary growth> No at-
tempt is made here to assess the costs and benefits of aiming
toward a balanced budget> What is clear is that the specification of
such an objectiverequires a consideration of the possible accompa-
nying inflation and variations in the rate of real growth>
of time longer than fiveyears, and because the model
does not reach its full equilibrium in five years time, it
is informative to carry on with the simulation through
time. To make a comparison possible between the
CEO’s analysis and the niodel’s sitnulations for this
longer’ per-iod, both the CEO’s baseline estimates for
primary l-eceipts and outlays and theadministiation’s
estimates were extended beyond 1989 at their-average
growth rates foi the 1987—89 period. This pr-ovided
sufficient input for the model to continue the simula-
tions past 1989. The model was simulated through
2015, when it reaches steady-state equilibr-ium>
Long-Term Simulations qfCBO
Baseline Estimates
Chart 2 summarizes the simulation r-esults using
the model and the CEO baseline projections for the
full pei-iod> Because dollar’ amounts ar’e gener’ally dif-
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Chart 2
Federal Debt Held by the Public as a Percent of GNP










ficult to interpret meaningfully when considered over-
long time periods, the results for- the federal debt are
pr-esented relative to GNP.
Chart 2 yields asurprising result. Here, federal debt
held by the public, expressed relative to GNP, rises
without limit for 4 and 6 pci-cent money growth. Only
with 8 percent money growth does the debt appear to
eventually decline relatiye to GNP.
Why the difference in the shoi-t-run and long-run
results? tsolating the r-easons for this difference re-
quit-es detailed examination of the time response of
receipts and outlays to r-ealgrowth. inflation and inter-
est iates. The nature of the long-term results reflects
primarily that outlays respond mor-e slowly to in-
flation than receipts do> In addition, becatise it takes
time foi- the debt to build up in response to deficits,
the cumulative effect of deficits takes the form of in-
creased outlays> These delays are further com-
pounded because inflation r’esponds more slowly to
money growth than output does.
Long-Term Simulations of the
Administration’s Budget
Char-t 3 summarizes the long-term simulations of
the administr-ation’s budget> Here the differences from
the 1984—89 horizon ar-c also striking>
Using 4 percent money growth, the simulations
showonly amodest upwar-d driftin thefederal debt as
apercent of GNPover the30-year period. With BandS
percent money growth, debt declines relative to GNP
and is eventually eliminated, resulting in anetcr-editor
position for- the federal government.’>
‘6currently, because the federal government borrows more than it
lends, it is a net debtor> Simulations showing the government as a
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Chart 3
Federal Debt Held by the Public as a Percent of GNP









There is a developing consensus that budget defi-
cits are growing at disquieting rates. To examine the
likelihood of future deficits, a monetary model was
expanded to include the determination ofbudget vari-
ables> Key budget variables were recalculated using
the CEO’s baseline estimates and theadministration’s
February 1984 budget. These simulation results indi-
cate that the prospects for abalanced budget depend
on the time path of monetary gr-owth. In particular,
achieving a balanced budget is facilitated by faster
money growth.
Another conclusion that derives from this study is
that a five-year planning horizon seems too short to
judge whether a particular set of policies is really re-
ducing the sequence of future deficits. Eecause of the
lag structure between policy variables and economic
variables, a decade or more might be necessary before
the full impact on deficits can be discerned.
The charts and tables in this article should not sug-
gest that considerable precision is possible in the
preparation ofbudget estimates — especially those for
a far distant period. The simulations ar-c meant to be
illustrative; they are conditioned by a largenumber of
assumptions, not the least of which is the model cho-
sen to derive the simulations. Nevertheless, the major
conclusion stands: the long-term process of reducing
budget deficits is difficult, but possible. In particular,
receipts and outlays depend on key economic var-ia-
bleslike real growth, inflation and interest rates; these,
in turn, depend crucially on the rate of monetary ex-
pansion> Thus, fiscal plans to i-educe deficits ovei-time
must be coordinated with monetary policy actions if
they are to be successful: any choice of deficit reduc-
tion viafaster money gr-owth must be assessed in con-
junction with the possible inflationary costs involved>
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Appendix A
A Monetary Model
The model used for simulations of the economic equations are estimated withAlmon constraints on
variables is summarized below> A dot over avariable the coefficients. Absolute values oft-statistics arein
indicates compounded annual i-ate ofchange. Most parentheses.
IT) GNP equation 4) ‘treasury bond iate equation
Sample period: 111960—IV/1981 Sample period: l11960—LV/1983
4 20
V 2>67 + 1>14 ~ M,, RI, = 2>88 + >96 ~ I’,,
2>60) 6.30) i0 1>96) (3>75) i=0
R>=36 SE=3>65 DW2>11 R>=>13 SE= >51 DW=T77 p>95
(5) GNP identity
12) Price equation Y, = P1100) X,
Sample period: L/1960—lVI1983 16) Demand pressure definition
X17 = )XF,/X,7<4
— 11-100
P,= >87+14 ~ PE,+ >09 ~ )X,—XF~>>)
2>30) i= 1 5>80) i—U (7) Priceanticipations definition
+ 1>11 PA, 21
(12>35) PA, = >96 ~
W=>72 SE=1>41 DW=2>01 ~=>15 i1
V = nominal GNP
3) Treasury brIl i-ate equation M = money stock Ml)
Sample period: l/1960—IV/1983 P = GNP deflator> 1972 = 100)
10 PE relative price ofener~’ 10 X = output in 1972 dollar-s
ES = >55 ~ X, + >99 I P. -
3 28) i = 0 (645) i = 0 potenLial output )Rasche-’l atom)
RL = Treasury bond i-ate
I1>= >15 5E >90 DW1>90 ~ >91 115 Treasurybillrate
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Appendix B
Budget Model
To estimate theeffect on budget projections of an Net interest
alternative set of economic assumptions, the
following budget variables were estimated: The estimation form of the net inter-est equa-
tion was derived from the following equation:
TI primary receipts: total receipts minus eai-nings
ofthe Federal Reserve System . t,~, D,~,
2) primary outlays:total outlays minus net interest I, = r,l — IS? + S,)l + Ii, — >—) — + I,
3) netinterest
The basic source for’ estimates of the relevant
elasticities were estimates published by the CEO where
(February 1984), Part I. Net interest was estimated I, = net interest in fiscal year
using fiscal year data for 1955—83.
= average yield on 3-month Treasury bills
Primary receipts and 10-yearTreasury bonds in year
The implied coefficients for receipts asderived 5 = budget surplus in fiscalyear- t = S~’— t +
from estimates prepared by the CEO were:
ARr = >75AX, + .81AX,~, — >O1AX.. + 26Ax,~, S~ = primarysurplusinfiscalyeart
+ .14 X,, + .21 X,~,+ >75 A t~+ .36 A P,. ir~’ = earnings oftheFederal Reserve System in
+ .ozAi’~, + >16AP~,— >06Al’~4
+ 13AP fiscalyeart
57 = financing from other than borr-owing
where
from the public in fiscal year’
= deviation of percent change in primary
receipts from baseline estimate in fiscal 0, = federal debt held by the public in fiscal
year’
year
Ak, = deviation of percent change in i-cal GNP M, = average length to maturity offederal debt
from baseline estimate in year (in years) at end offiscal year’
= deviation ofpercent change in GNP defla-
tor from baseline estimate inyear The first term on the right-hand side repr-esents
Primary outlays borrowing from thepublic in the current flscalyear.
The second term isan approximation ofthe change
The implied coefficients for outlays as derived in interest cost due to refinancing maturing debt.
from estimates prepared by the CEO were: This equation was solved for I, in the form shown
A O~= 25 Ak, + >06 A k,, + >03 A *1. — >03 A *~., below. Since it is an approximation, the equation
+ >01 k,. — >02 AX,5
+ >00 A ~, + >39 A 1’ was estimated using data from 1953—83:
Ii, r
+21Ap+>14A+>0oAl’4+>1sAp,~ t, A7j—)—S~—ir~”—S) +
where (2>02)[ i—i, ] 7.19) Mj
Ij 1
A O~ = deviation of percent change in primary + >91 I—Il — M~-
11
’j
outlays from baseline estimate in fiscal 10>88)
yeart I1~=99 SE=z>05 DW=1>95 p,=—>34 p
1
=>17
16